

CDDRL

WORKING PAPER

February 2021

Government Quality and State Capacity: Survey
Results from Brazil

Ana Karine Pereira
Raphael Amorim Machado
Pedro Luiz Costa Cavalcante
Alexandre de Avila Gomide
Amanda Gomes Magalhaes
Isabella de Araujo Goellner
Roberto Rocha Coelho Pires

IPEA

Katherine Bersch
Stanford Governance Project, Davidson College

Francis Fukuyama
Stanford University

Alan Ricardo da Silva
University of Brazil

1 INTRODUCTION¹

Research on the factors that influence the implementation of public policies, their final impacts, and the effectiveness of state action have gained prominence in the field of public policy analysis (Cingolani, Thomsson, and Crombrugghe, 2015). In this context, a core question of the contemporary research agenda is: what factors are necessary for governments to achieve their organizational missions and policy proposals? To address this question, the state capacity approach has been widely used in a variety of research that looks at how governments mobilize and combine their human, financial, and informational resources to deliver quality services (Christensen and Gazley, 2008). In this sense, recent studies have pointed to state capacity as a critical element for the promotion of development outcomes (Rothstein, 2011; Fukuyama, 2013).

The perspective of state capacity stems from the statist movement of the 1970s and 1980s, which was characterized by research that focused on the state as factor for explaining social and economic processes and outcomes (Skocpol, 1985). At that time, high state capacity was associated with the presence of bureaucracies in the Weberian sense: professionalized, meritocratic, hierarchical, and cohesive (Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, 1985). This association inspired the elaboration of bureaucracy quality indexes composed of a combination of Weberian indicators to explain state performance such as the classic Evans and Rauch (1999) study.

This research has reached Brazilian academic production and the past years have been characterized by the publication of relevant studies on national bureaucracy. In addition to these studies, recent research has triggered the use of quantitative methodologies to evaluate the general patterns and tendencies of Brazilian bureaucracy, such as studies on mid-level bureaucracy (Cavalcante and Lotta, 2015) and the economic infrastructure sector (De Paula et al., 2017).

At the international level, there are also multiple efforts to measure and compare the quality of governance between countries - such as the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and the Quality of Government Institute's Expert Survey. However, the limitations of these initiatives have resulted in the inability to capture within

¹ The research team involved in this project is grateful for the collaboration of all the public servants of the Brazilian State who took the time to fill out our research questionnaire. Special thanks to Fernando José Brustolin, an Ipea technician, who assisted us in the operationalization of the questionnaire on the LimeSurvey.com platform, and Mirian Lucia Bittencourt Guimarães, coordinator of the Personnel Management Secretariat in the Ministry of Planning, Development, and Management (SGP/MPDG) and his team, which made it possible to send the questionnaire by email to the public servants randomly selected in the sample.

country variation; the use of surveys to capture only the perception of outside experts; and confusion about whether surveys should include inputs, outputs, and outcomes (Boittin, Distelhorst, and Fukuyama, 2016).

This research report intends to contribute to this debate by presenting the general results of a survey administered to civil servants of the Brazilian federal public administration between May and July 2018, encompassing career bureaucrats and appointed positions in the federal executive branch of the Brazilian government. The survey is part of the Governance Project, conducted by the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University in the United States, in partnership with the Institute of Applied Economics Research (*Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada*, IPEA), an agency of the Brazilian federal government. The Governance Project seeks to measure state capacity in a comparative manner in a number of countries, including the United States, China, Brazil, India, South Africa, and Ukraine. The collection of responses in Brazil was carried out with the support of the Brazilian Ministry of Planning's (MPDG) Secretariat for Personnel Management and Labor Relations.

Our survey measures key components of state capacity and other related concepts. Many questions are based on the U.S. Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, administered by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management to U.S. bureaucrats every year, which measures employees' perceptions of whether, and to what extent, conditions characteristic of successful organizations are present in their agencies (FEVS, 2016).² The CDDRL and IPEA teams also added other dimensions and questions that they considered critical factors for our understanding the process of transforming government inputs into results. These questions are detailed in the next section.

This report is divided into five sections following this introduction. The following section presents the analytical-theoretical framework that informed the selection of state capacity dimensions. The third section describes the methodological procedures, explaining the instruments of data collection and application of the questionnaire, the universe of research, and the sample. The fourth section presents the general results of the survey by dimension. Finally, we present final considerations and a research agenda of possible in-depth analyses. It should be stressed that this report represents the first of a series of products, which will address these topics in greater depth.

² For more information, access the link: <<https://www.opm.gov/fevs/>>.

2 THEORETICAL-ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of state capabilities, as well as their dimensions, is quite diverse and contested (Cingolani, 2013; Gomide, Pereira, and Machado, 2017). Thus, the elaboration of the questions that compose the survey was based on a reconstruction of the various debates about dimensions and factors that involve and influence state capacity, among them Fukuyama (2013); Wu, Ramesh, and Howllet (2015); and Gomide e Pires (2016). The purpose of this section is to briefly describe this debate, placing the selected dimensions for study in the theoretical-analytical discussion.

The idea of state capacity relates to the concept of effectiveness and the government's ability to mobilize multiple resources in order to achieve organizational goals (Christensen and Gazley, 2008). Thus, one of the main areas of scholarly concern is the state's performance. This performance has been measured in different ways, depending on the sector of public policy studied. Evans and Rauch (1999), for example, assess state performance and its influence on gross domestic product (GDP), while Sátyro, Cunha, and Campos (2016) evaluate its effect on social assistance services.

Other concerns in the field of state capacity focus on factors that interfere in state performance. This research has evolved to encompass multiple dimensions. The first debates on state capacity go back to the literature on the formation of modern states, which underscored the relationship between war, tax extraction, and the development of strong states (Tilly, 1975). These studies gained greater prominence in the 1980s as a result of the statist movement's call for a state-centered theory in which the state was interpreted as an autonomous actor shaping political and social phenomena (Skocpol, 1985).

In this context, and based also on Weberian influences, one of the most important factors explaining the capacity of the state to reach its objectives is meritocracy. The principal criterion for meritocratic recruitment is professional qualifications, validated by merit exams and other educational and technical certificates (Fukuyama, 2013). This type of recruitment would ensure that the bureaucracy possessed the technical knowledge needed to develop and manage coherent and long-term planning (Skocpol, 1985, Evans, and Rauch, 1999; Skocpol and Finegold, 1982). Thus, meritocracy appears as a core element that would enable both professionalization and rationalization of the state. In addition, meritocracy would stimulate the formation of a corporate identity, making public servants more likely to internalize and comply with rules.

State capacity is also influenced by autonomy. Autonomy was understood by Skocpol as the possibility of elaborating governmental goals and objectives without the interference of social groups (Skocpol, 1985). Autonomy has been cited by a number of authors as important for avoiding fragmentation of the state structure by pulverized social interests and preventing the capture of bureaucracy by private groups and interests (Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol and Finegold, 1982). More recent studies have understood that a bureaucracy's autonomy from the political sphere can also affect the state's ability to shield the bureaucracy from short-term political interests (Bersch, Praça, and Taylor, 2017a, 2017b; Cingolani, Thomsson, and Crombrughe, 2015). Fukuyama (2013) defines autonomy as the possibility for bureaucrats to shape organizational objectives and missions independently of their principals (politicians). For Fukuyama, the effects of bureaucratic autonomy depend on the level of professionalization: when levels of professionalization are high, autonomy is interpreted as a positive factor for organizational performance and the production of innovations; when these levels are low, autonomy can produce dysfunctional outcomes.

Peter Evans's classic study of the differing performance of countries to implement a developmental agenda from the 1950s to the 1970s questions the effects of bureaucratic autonomy on social groups and inserts a new factor that influences capacity building: a bureaucracy's relationships. For Evans (1993), successful cases - such as South Korea and Japan - presented a bureaucratic structure that surpassed the strictly Weberian model. Thus, in addition to these bureaucracies being meritocratic and professionalized, they were also able to establish virtuous ties with local business, which is essential as it provides information to adjust and monitor industrialization programs. In his recent work, Evans (2010; 2011) points out that the connections of the bureaucracy with actors outside the State must also include civil society. In the case of Brazil, the complexity of the post-redemocratization political-institutional environment has drawn the attention of researchers to the fact that the state's ability to implement public policies depends on a broad relational pattern, involving relations between executing bureaucracy and control bodies, federal bureaucracy and state and municipal bureaucracies, and bureaucracies of different sectors (Pires and Gomide, 2016). Thus, state capacity would depend on intersectoral, interpersonal, and social coordination skills (Lotta and Favareto, 2016; Abers, Oliveira, and Pereira, 2017).

Finally, recent research on the concept of state capacity has highlighted factors related to skills, resources, and the external environment. Along these lines, Wu, Ramesh,

and Howlett (2015) analyze the capacities for the production of public policies from a set of competencies and resources considered essential for the State's performance. The authors focus on three competencies - analytical, operational, and political - and three levels of resources - individual, systemic, and organizational. The skills necessary for the effective performance of a bureaucrat are paralleled in the "competencies" category. For Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett, analytical skills produce technically robust policies; operational skills guarantee coherence between available resources and actions; and policies involve political support and sustainability. The state's systemic level includes important factors from the external environment, including the trust of society and the relationship between the organization and the political sphere. Individual resources relate to the availability of a structure of technical knowledge; and the organizational resources encompass the management of human, informational, and financial resources.

From this theoretical-analytical framework, the survey was written with the objective of capturing information on aspects of state capacity that include performance, meritocracy, autonomy, relationships, skills, resources, and external environment. The complete questionnaire is found in the appendix of this report. Table 1 details the indicators for each dimension of state capacity and relates them to the survey questions.

CHART 1

Indicators and theoretical basis

Dimension	Indicators	Questions	References
Meritocracy	Recruitment of people with the necessary skills	QB1; QB4	Evans and Rauch (1999); Fukuyama (2013); Souza (2017); Skocpol and Finegold (1982)
	Appointment for commission office position and promotions based on the technical competence criteria	QB2; QB3; QB5 a QB8	Cingolani, Thomsson, and Crombrughe (2015)
Autonomy	Autonomy as the capacity of a bureaucrat to influence the decision-making process from technical knowledge	QC4; QC5	Abers and Santiago (2017); Skocpol (1985)
	Autonomy as discretion of a bureaucrat (in relation to rules and hierarchy)	QC2; QC6; QC10; QC11	Lotta and Santiago (2017); Abers (2015)
	Autonomy as bureaucrats' independence from political actors	QC3; QC8; QC9; QC12; QC13	Fukuyama (2013); Bersch, Praça, and Taylor (2017); Nistotskaya and Cingolani (2015)

Relationships	Interaction with state actors	QF1 to QF7	Pires and Gomide (2016); Lotta and Favareto (2016); Vilaça (2017)
	Interaction with non-state actors	QF8 to QF11	Huerta (2008); Evans (1993; 1995; 2010; 2011); Mann (2008); Pires and Gomide (2016); Grisa <i>et al.</i> (2017); Soifer and Hau (2008)
Skills	Management skills	QG5; QG7	Howlett and Ramesh (2016)
	Analytical Skills	QG1 to QG3	Howlett and Ramesh (2016)
	Political Skills	QG4; QG6	Howlett and Ramesh (2016)
Resources	Organizational resources	QE1 to QE5; QE7 to QE9; QE11	Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett (2015); Grisa <i>et al.</i> (2017)
	Systemic resources	QE6; QE10; QE12; QE13	Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett (2015)
External environment	Organizational culture	QD1	Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett (2015)
	Relationship with civil society	QD2; QD3; QD4; QD6	Evans (1993; 2010; 2011); Pires and Gomide (2016)
	Coordination with other levels of the government	QD5	Lotta and Favareto (2016)
Performance	Results produced	QH1; QH2	Sátyro, Cunha, and Campos (2016); Evans and Rauch (1999)
	Available resources for producing results	QH3	Grisa <i>et al.</i> (2017)
	Skills available for producing results	QH4	-

Elaborated by the authors.

3 METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES

The questionnaire was composed of seven sections and a sociodemographic identification section of the respondent sample. The first section was devoted to the theme of meritocracy; the second raised questions about the degree of autonomy with questions related to the bureaucrat's duties and ability to act; aspects of the external environment of the bureaucracy were addressed in the third section; the fourth section dealt with resources and obstacles in bureaucrats' work environment; the fifth section asked about the relationships and interactions of the bureaucrats with other units of the federal bureaucracy; the sixth section questioned the skills required for the exercise of bureaucratic function; the seventh section asked about the effectiveness of the action of a

bureaucrat within the bureaucratic organization in which he is inserted; and inserted throughout the questionnaire were two sections with questions regarding sociodemographic information.

The survey participants were composed of civilian federal civil servants—permanent employees and appointed positions (commissioned positions known as *cargos comissionados*)—who formulate and implement public policies of the federal administration, autarchies/foundations, and regulatory agencies.

Such a strategy is widely used in similar research on the workings of bureaucracy, such as that used by the US Government's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, which was designed to produce valid results that represent federal employees in the government as a whole, as well as employees in agencies and subagencies.

The link containing the questionnaire and the clarifications about the survey were sent to the e-mails of select public-sector employees. More e-mails were sent by the Ministry of Planning (MPDG)³ team to those who had not yet responded in order to reiterate the request and reach the appropriate number of respondents.

3.1 Exclusions

Excluded from this sample are: appointed positions (*cargos*) and careers (*carreiras*) that act as executors of public policies at the street level;⁴ appointed positions and careers of state-owned enterprises and mixed-capital companies; appointed positions and careers of federal public banks; and appointed positions and careers in the military. These bureaucracies are quite numerous, but they are distinct from the rest of central administration in a number of ways, and the inclusion of these careers could bias the results, oversimplifying the state's performance in the delivery of public policy. This study therefore excludes the following.

- 1) Positions/careers that act as street-level bureaucrats (in the execution of public policies):
 - health professionals (doctors, nurses, and nursing assistants);
 - teachers: elementary, middle, and high school;
 - university technicians; and
 - police officers and notary public (except the chief of police).

³ The full name is the Ministry of Planning, Development, and Management (Ministério do Planejamento, Desenvolvimento e Gestão).

⁴ Street bureaucrats are employees who work directly in contact with individuals that use public services, such as police officers, teachers, health professionals, among others (Lipsky, 1980).

- 2) Military personnel.
- 3) Positions/careers of state-owned companies and mixed-capital companies.
- 4) Positions/careers in federal banks.
- 5) List of excluded organizations in the central government:
 - Aeronautics, Navy, and, Army commands;
 - Aeronautical Real Estate Financing Fund;
 - the government of the former territory of Rondônia;
 - government of the former territory of Roraima; and
 - government of the former territory of Amapá.
- 6) In the Ministry of Education (MEC), we exclude bodies that implement education policy, such as universities and federal institutes, and we only maintain:
 - the ministry itself (governmental entities);
 - Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (Capes);
 - The National Education Development Fund (FNDE); and
 - The National Institute of Studies and Educational Research Anísio Teixeira (INEP).

3.2 Sample strata

The stratification is based on three criteria: positions and careers, which relate to the type of employment relationship established between the civil servant and the federal public administration; politically appointed position (commissioned position known as *cargo comissionado*); and the legal model of the organization to which the employee is assigned.

The first criteria, positions and careers, was subdivided into three, which are: i) employees with a stable employment relationship with the public administration; ii) employees without a stable employment relationship with the public administration, only appointed positions; and iii) others, including subcontractors, temporary contracts, consultants, etc.

The second criteria, politically appointed position, was also subdivided into three, which are: i) employees with a “*função comissionada*” are civil servants who receive their regular salary based on their civil servant contract, but who receive an additional bonus for filling a politically appointed position within the administration; ii) politically appointed positions (Management and Higher Advising Positions [known as *DAS* in

Portuguese] or the equivalent), with or without a stable employment relationship with the public administration; and iii) others, which do not fall under any of the two criteria mentioned above.

The last criteria, the legal organizational model, subdivided the federal public administration into three groups: i) governmental entities, which include the Presidency of the Republic and the ministries; ii) agencies (autarchies) or foundations under public law (*autarquias ou fundações públicas de direito público*); and iii) regulatory agencies, which are autarchies, under a special regime.

This selection made possible a broad representation of policy sectors within the Brazilian administration, with a sample population of 4,671 civil servants out of a universe of 263,498.

These three strata define the representative universe of our sample, as can be seen below.

1) Positions/careers:

- linked to the public administration;
- without employment relationship with the public administration (commission office position only); and
- other.

2) Politically appointed positions:

- with function/gratification (exclusive to the civil servant with permanent employment);
- Free appointment and discharge position (DAS or equivalent); and
- other.

3) Legal organizational model:

- governmental entities (ministry);
- Agencies (autarchies) or foundation; and
- regulatory agencies.

3.3 Sample

According to the definition of the sample strata described above, the sampling frame was assembled based on the data available in the federal government transparency portal⁵ for

⁵ Available at: <<http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br>>.

November 2017, the last update available in the system. The sampling frame counted on 263,498 eligible civil servants according to the distribution present in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Disposition of Civil Servants and Sample According to Defined Strata

Legal organizational model	Positions/careers	Appointed positions	Population	Sample
Governmental entities (ministry)	Other	Free appointment and discharge position (<i>DAS</i> or equivalent)	8,478	369
Governmental entities (ministry)	Other	Other	12,122	374
Governmental entities (ministry)	No employment relationship	Other	25,940	380
Governmental entities (ministry)	Employment relationship with federal public administration	With appointed position/bonus (<i>função/gratificação</i>)	16,240	377
Governmental entities (ministry)	Employment relationship with federal public administration	Other	76,919	384
Regulatory agency	Other	Free appointment and discharge position	646	242
Regulatory agency	Other	Other	311	173
Regulatory agency	Employment relationship with federal public administration	With appointed position/bonus	2,384	332
Regulatory agency	Employment relationship with federal public administration	Other	6,016	362
Agency or foundation	Other	Free appointment and discharge position	3,524	348
Agency or foundation	Other	Other	43,354	382
Agency or foundation	No employment relationship	Other	382	192
Agency or foundation	Employment relationship with federal public administration	With appointed position/bonus	11,569	373
Agency or foundation	Employment relationship with federal public administration	Other	55,613	383
Total			263,498	4,671

Elaborated by the authors.

The initial sample size required for each of the strata was calculated according to equation (1), considering 95% confidence ($z_{\alpha/2} = 1.96$), 5% error ($d=0.05$) and maximum variance of 0.25 for proportions (Cochran, 1977, p. 75):

$$n_0 = \frac{z_{\alpha/2}^2 \times 0.25}{d^2} = \frac{1.96^2 \times 0.25}{0.05^2} = 385 \quad \text{and} \quad n = \frac{n_0}{1+n_0/N}, \quad (1)$$

in which N is the number of public servants in the sampling frame. For example, for the first row of table 1, the sample is calculated as $n = \frac{n_0}{1+n_0/N} = \frac{385}{1+385/8478} = 369$.

To avoid creating additional sample lists, a larger sample, estimated at 1,215 civil servants in each strata of the same table, was selected according to equation 2 (Cochran, 1977, p.372), considering that the variance of the non-respondents S_2^2 is equal to the variance of the data S^2 and a non-response rate of 60% defined at first ($w_2 = 0.6$ and $w_1 = 0.4$, since $w_1 + w_2 = 1$):

$$K_{opt} = \sqrt{\frac{c_2(1-w_2)}{c_0+c_1w_1}} = \sqrt{\frac{6.76(1-0.6)}{(0.1+0.1 \times 0.4)}} = 4.3948 \quad \text{and}$$

$$n'_{opt} = n(1 + (k_{opt} - 1)w_2) = 1215 \quad (2)$$

where n is the conservative sample size considering 95% confidence and maximum variance given by $n = \frac{1}{d^2} = \frac{1}{0.05^2} = 400$, $c_0 = 0.1$ (R\$ 00.10) is the cost of sending the questionnaires, $c_1 = 0.1$ (R\$ 00.10) is the cost of processing the questionnaire and $c_2 = 6.66 + 0.1 = 6.76$ (BRL\$ 6.76) is the cost of contacting users who did not respond to the questionnaire after two attempts and processing the questionnaire. The amount of BRL\$6.66 was calculated considering the estimated cost of an individual with weekly compensation of BRL\$1.2 thousand, working six hours a day, which would generate thirty hours a week and, consequently, $\text{BRL}\$1,200/30 = \text{BRL}\40 per hour, considering that in one hour it is possible to contact six public servants, in an average time of ten minutes for each contact ($\text{BRL}\$40/6 = \text{BRL}\6.66). The processing cost of these questionnaires continues as R\$00.10, thus generating $c_2 = 6.66 + 0.1 = 6.76$. For this larger sample, a link containing the questionnaire was sent to the public servants. The questionnaire is supported on the limesurvey.com online platform,⁶ ensuring control and

⁶ Available at: <<https://www.limesurvey.org/>>.

real-time monitoring of the progress of the respondent rate established by the sampling method. In total, the questionnaires were sent to $n = 14,704$ civil servants, and the required sample is $n = 4,671$, according to Table 1.

3.4 Analysis of Results

The data was collected between May 15 and July 17, 2018, totaling 3,226 respondents, which is almost 70% of the sample required. Table 2 shows the percentages of the samples obtained by the stratification. It can be seen that some strata had a satisfactory response rate of over 80%, while two strata were below 40% and only 2%.

In order to expand the population sample results, the sample weights of each stratum are calculated as:

$$w_i = \frac{N_i}{n_i} \quad , \quad (3)$$

where i stands for each stratum (line) of Table 1. For the first line (i.e. Governmental entities (ministry) / Other / Free Appointment/Discharge position), the weight is given by $8,478 / 220 = 38,536$. Thus, adding all the weights in the sample of 3,226 civil servants, we arrive at the total of 263,468 civil servants, used as the basis for the selection of the sample.

The confidence interval for this sample was 95%, which means that the estimates contained in this report are statistically reliable for the set of selected respondents.

TABLE 2
Sample Distribution Required and Answered According to Defined Strata

Legal Organizational model	Positions/careers	Politically appointed positions (DAS)	Sample answered	Required sample	Answered (%)
Governmental entities (ministry)	Other	Free appointment/discharge position	220	369	59.62
Governmental entities (ministry)	Other	Other	187	374	50.00
Governmental entities (ministry)	No employment relationship	Other	115	380	30.26
Governmental entities (ministry)	Employment relationship with federal public administration	With appointed position/bonus	293	377	77.72
Governmental entities (ministry)	Employment relationship with federal public administration	Other	160	384	41.67

Regulatory agency	Other	Free appointment/discharge position	148	242	61.16
Regulatory agency	Other	Other	63	173	36.42
Regulatory agency	Employment relationship with federal public administration	With appointed position/bonus	466	332	1404.00
Regulatory agency	Employment relationship with federal public administration	Others	374	362	103.30
Agency or foundation	Other	Free appointment/discharge position	302	348	86.78
Agency or foundation	Other	Other	249	382	65.18
Agency or foundation	No employment relationship	Other	4	192	2.08
Agency or foundation	Employment relationship with federal public administration	With appointed position/bonus	403	373	108.00
Agency or foundation	Employment relationship with federal public administration	Other	242	383	63.19
Total			3,226	4,671	-

Elaborated by the authors.

4 RESULTS

4.1 Meritocracy

The survey encompassed eight questions about meritocracy. The first three questions relate to the level of agreement of the respondent regarding the ability of their work unit to recruit people with the right skills, to carry out promotions in the work unit based on merit, and whether nominations for politically appointed positions should be based on merit.

Table 3 and Figure 1 show that most respondents estimate that nominations for appointed positions should be based on merit (62% strongly agree, and 30% agree). However, only 4% strongly agree, and 20% agree that the promotions in their work units are based on merit. Regarding the same question, 34% stated that they disagree and 19% answered that they strongly disagree. As for the work unit's ability to recruit people with the right skills, only 9% strongly agree, and 36% agree with the statement that "My work unit can recruit people with the right skills".

TABLE 3

Agreement of Civil Servants Regarding Statements on Meritocracy¹

Degree of agreement	Promotions for political appointees in my work unit are based on merit	My work unit can recruit people with the right skills	Politically appointed positions should be based on merit
I strongly agree	4	9	62
I agree	20	36	30
I do not agree or disagree	20	18	4
I disagree	34	28	2
I strongly disagree	19	8	1
I do not know / I refuse to answer	2	1	1
Total	100	100	100


Elaborated by the authors.

Note: ¹ Percentage values shown in the tables and charts in this report are approximate.

CHART 1

Public Servants' Degree of Agreement about the Statements Referring to Meritocracy¹

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors

Note: Values less than 3% were hidden in the chart for better visualization.

The level of satisfaction of civil servants was also verified based on the level of recognition that they receive for performing well (Table 4 and Chart 2). Most respondents (41%) said they were satisfied with their level of recognition, followed by 22% who said they were "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied". The minority of the respondents positioned themselves in the extremes: as "very dissatisfied" (7%) or "very satisfied" (13%).

TABLE 4

Satisfaction of Civil Servants for Recognition of Performing Well


	Frequency	(%)
Very dissatisfied	236	7
Dissatisfied	562	17
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	702	22
Satisfied	1,309	41
Very satisfied	404	13
I do not know / I refuse to answer	13	0
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 2

Satisfaction of Civil Servants for Recognition of Performing Well

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Finally, the survey asked the respondents to assess the importance of technical competence, political party affiliation, career expertise, and personal network for the nomination to politically appointed positions. Table 5 and Chart 3 indicate that most respondents estimate that technical competence (73%) and career expertise (49%) are very important for these appointments. Many respondents also believe that membership in political parties (76%) is irrelevant to politically appointed positions. In turn, 40% of respondents suggest that personal network is important in getting these positions.

TABLE 5

Degree of Importance of Factors for Appointment to Politically Appointed Position

(On %)


Degree of importance	Technical competence	Affiliation to political parties	Career expertise	Personal relationship network
Not important	2	76	3	12
Unimportant	4	13	8	24
Important	20	5	39	40
Very important	73	3	49	23
I do not know/I refuse to answer	1	3	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 3

Degree of Importance of Factors for Appointment to Politically Appointed Position

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values less than 3% were hidden in the chart for better visualization.

4.2 Autonomy

The autonomy section consists of thirteen survey questions. The first four questions assess the level of agreement of the respondent regarding the government's use of their skills and abilities, the option to engage in new and different work styles, the ability to make their own decisions in carrying out their work, and the consideration of their technical abilities for the approval of a project. The data in Table 6 and Chart 4 indicate that most respondents disagree (38%) with the assertion that the government uses their skills to the fullest extent. Together, participants who disagree and strongly disagree with this assertion make up 50% of responses. Still, 22% neither agree nor disagree, and another 22% agree. The minority of the respondents are in the extreme categories of strongly disagree (13%) and strongly agree (4%). However, the perception of the respondents is slightly more positive regarding autonomy of the internal dynamics of their work. Thus, 36% agree that they are encouraged to engage in new and better ways of working, 46% agree that they have the conditions to make their own decisions at work and 32% agree that the approval of a project depends on their technical abilities.

TABLE 6
The Degree of Agreement for Statements about Autonomy
 (On %)


Degree of importance	I feel like the government takes maximum advantage of my talents	In my current position, I feel empowered to bring new and better ways of doing things	I can make my own decisions when doing my job	The approval of a project depends on my technical abilities
I strongly disagree	13	9	5	10
I disagree	38	22	17	24
I do not agree or disagree	22	20	16	26
I agree	22	36	46	32
I strongly agree;	4	12	15	5
I do not know / I refuse to answer	1	1	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 4

The Degree of Agreement for Statements about Autonomy

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

The survey also incorporated a question about the civil servants' level of satisfaction with their involvement in decisions that affect their work. Most respondents (39%) said they were satisfied with their level of involvement, followed by 25% who were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 22% were dissatisfied, 6% were very unsatisfied and 6% were very satisfied (Table 7 and Chart 5).

TABLE 7

Degree of Satisfaction with the Autonomy of Decisions


	Frequency	(%)
Very unsatisfied	180	6
Dissatisfied	725	22
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	822	25
Satisfied	1,264	39
Very satisfied	206	6
I do not know / I refuse to answer	29	1
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 5

Degree of Satisfaction with the Autonomy of Decisions

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

It was also asked how often formal rules and regulations prevent civil servants from performing their work. Most respondents (42%) say that "sometimes" the rules restricted the execution of their work. A significant part of the responses were in conflict because 27% of the respondents claimed that the rules "often" prevent civil servants from performing their work and 22% claimed that the same situation "rarely" occurs (Table 8 and Chart 6).

TABLE 8

Frequency of Rules as Obstacles to the Performance of Work


	Frequency	(%)
Never	166	5
Rarely	705	22
Sometimes	1,346	42
Often	865	27
Always	107	3
I do not know/ I do not want to answer	37	1
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 6

Frequency of Rules as Obstacles to the Performance of Work

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values less than 3% were hidden in the chart for better visualization.

Four other questions investigated the attractiveness of public sector careers for the graduates of the best universities in the county, if the civil servants benefit from their positions, whether civil servants are politically neutral in the performance of their functions, if they obey their superiors strictly, and whether they have the freedom to replace formal rules in favor of their judgment.

According to Table 9 and Chart 7, most respondents agree (43%) that public sector careers are desired by graduates of top universities. However, there is a negative perception of the impartiality of civil servants, as most disagree that "civil servants never benefit from their positions, except for salary" (42%) and that "civil servants are politically neutral in the performance of their functions" (41%). There is a perception of the possibility of discretion of the civil servant. Most respondents claim they disagree with the statement that civil servants should strictly obey their superiors (39%). However, 53% of respondents disagree that civil servants are free to replace formal rules in favor of their own judgment.

TABLE 9

Degree of Agreement on the Attractiveness of Public Service - Impartiality and Discretion

(On %)


Degree of agreement	Graduates from the country's best universities desire a top-level career in the public sector	Civil servants never benefit from their jobs, except their salary	Civil servants are politically neutral in performing their jobs	Civil servants should strictly obey their superiors	Civil servants are free to replace formal rules in favor of their judgment
I strongly disagree	2	8	13	7	31
I disagree	17	42	41	39	53
I do not agree or disagree	18	22	22	25	9
I agree	43	18	18	24	4
I strongly agree	16	6	4	5	1
I do not know / I refuse to answer	4	4	3	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 7

Degree of Agreement on the Attractiveness of Public Service - Impartiality and Discretion

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values less than 3% were hidden in the chart for better visualization

Finally, two other questions were asked to capture respondents' perceptions of the importance of political connections. To obtain a salary increase, 55% of the respondents consider connections important, with 34% believing it's "important" and 21% believing it is "very important". To achieve policy objectives, these connections are perceived to be even more highly valued, as 71% of the respondents believe they are relevant: 44% stating that this factor is "important," and 27% stating it's "very important" (Table 10 and Chart 8).

TABLE 10

Degree of Importance of Political Connections

(On %)


Degree of importance	Obtain a salary increase	Achieving the goal of public policy
Not important	21	9
Moderately important	17	13
Important	34	44
Very important	21	27
I do not know /I refuse to answer	7	6
Total	100	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 8

Degree of Importance of Political Connections

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors

5 RELATIONSHIPS

The survey questioned the respondents about the frequency of interaction in the last twelve months with eleven different bodies/institutions. As shown in Table 11, most respondents stated that they had not interacted in the last year with the eleven listed bodies. This pattern is especially strong in the case of the National Congress, Judiciary Branch, and international organizations - where 75%, 66%, and 67% respectively stated that they had not interacted once in the past year. The same trend is observed for other organizations and agencies linked to the organization where the respondent works (29%), separate agencies or ministries (39%) and private companies (35%).

TABLE 11 Frequency of Interaction Last Year

(On %)

	Not once last year	Biannual	Quarterly	Monthly	Weekly	I do not know/ I refuse to answer	Total
Other organizations or agencies linked to their agency	29	14	11	22	21	4	100
Bodies of other ministries	39	17	12	17	11	4	
Congress / parliamentarians	75	9	5	4	3	4	
Judiciary / members of the judiciary	66	10	6	8	5	4	
Control agencies (TCU, CGU, MPF)	53	20	10	8	5	5	
City halls	60	12	8	10	5	5	
State government	63	14	7	8	4	5	
Private companies	35	11	10	18	22	4	
International organizations	67	11	7	7	2	5	
Civil society organizations	56	13	11	9	5	5	
Universities and research institutes	47	17	10	12	9	5	

Elaborated by the authors.

Note: TCU - Federal Court of Accounts; CGU - Office of the Comptroller General of the Federal Government; and MPF - Federal Prosecution Service.

5.1 Skills

In the survey, seven individual skills were listed, and the respondent was asked to indicate their level of agreement regarding whether the civil servants in their organization had the skills described. The responses reveal a positive perception of individual skills, which is shown in Table 12 and Chart 9, as all questions have the most responses in the “I agree” category. When added, the categories “I agree” and “strongly agree”, show that more than 50% of the respondents believe that the civil servants working in the same organization possess skills related to research, communication and knowledge of the public policies of the industry.

TABLE 12

Degree of Agreement Regarding the Existence of Skills

(On %)


Degree of agreement	Knowledge of public policies in the activity sector	Research	Analysis of public policies	Leadership	Conflict management	Building Interpersonal Relationships	Communication
I strongly disagree	3	4	5	5	9	8	5
Disagree	19	22	24	22	28	20	20
I do not agree or disagree	16	19	25	26	25	23	21
I agree	48	41	36	38	31	40	45
I strongly agree	11	13	7	7	6	7	8
I do not know / I refuse to answer	3	2	3	1	2	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 9

Degree of Agreement Regarding the Existence of Skills

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values less than 3% were hidden in the chart for better visualization.

5.2 Resources

The survey also questioned the respondents about their level of agreement concerning thirteen possible obstacles to the good performance of their organization. Table 13 and Chart 10 show that budgetary resources are perceived as a factor that impairs the performance of their agencies. Thus, 44% of the respondents stated that they agree that the budget is an obstacle to the organization's performance and 28% strongly agree with the same assessment. Human resources are also assessed as an obstacle to agency performance, where 38% agree that it is an obstacle and 23% strongly agree with the same assessment. The same analysis is repeated for the factors of technological resources, legislation, and turnover of senior management.

TABLE 13

Degree of Agreement Regarding Resources as Organizational Obstacles

(On %)

Degree of agreement	Human Resources	Budget	Technological resources	Legislation	Stability of the management board
I strongly disagree	4	2	4	3	5
I disagree	24	14	23	24	26
I do not agree or disagree	10	10	10	21	17
I agree	38	44	40	36	31
I strongly agree	23	28	22	13	17
I do not know/I refuse to answer	2	2	1	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100


Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages.

CHART 10

Degree of Agreement Regarding Resources as Organizational Obstacles

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values less than 3% were hidden in the chart for better visualization.

When asked if the relationship with the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministério Público Federal; MPF) with the Legislative Branch, and with states and municipalities, represent obstacles to the good performance of its organizations, the answers were varied in the categories of "I disagree", "I do not agree or disagree" and "I agree", according to Table 14 and Chart 11.

TABLE 14

Degree of Agreement Regarding Relational Resources as Obstacles to the Performance of the Agency in which the Civil Servant Works

(On %)

Degree of agreement	Coordination with the Judiciary Branch and Federal Prosecution Service	Coordination with Legislative Branch	Interfederal coordination instruments with states and municipalities
I strongly disagree	4	3	4
I disagree	25	21	25
I do not agree or disagree	27	26	27
I agree	25	31	26
I strongly agree	8	11	7
I do not know / I refuse to answer	9	8	10
Total	100	100	100


Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages.

CHART 11

Degree of Agreement Regarding Relational Resources as Obstacles to the Performance of the Agency in which the Civil Servant Works

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

2. Values less than 3% were hidden on the chart for better visualization.

Similarly, the degree of agreement on whether audits and control processes, social participation and access to key political decision makers pose obstacles to the good performance of the work unit, is split between the categories of “I disagree,” “I do not agree or disagree” and “I agree”. In the case of resources related to planning, monitoring, and evaluation processes and political party interference, the spectrum of responses is even broader and is divided between, “I disagree,” “I do not agree or disagree,” “I agree” and “I strongly agree” (Table 15 and Chart 12).

TABLE 15

Degree of Agreement on Resources such as Management Obstacles and Politicians

(On %)


Degree of agreement	Planning, monitoring, and evaluation processes	Audits and control processes	Social participation	Access to key political decision makers	Political party interference
I strongly disagree	4	8	10	4	5
I disagree	23	36	40	22	13
I do not agree or disagree	16	22	21	25	13
I agree	39	22	18	29	32
I strongly agree	16	7	5	9	30
I do not know / I refuse to answer	2	5	6	9	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 12

Degree of Agreement on Resources such as Management Obstacles and Politicians

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

2. Values less than 3% were hidden on the chart for better visualization.

5.3 External environment

The survey presented six questions related to the external environment, asking the respondents their degree of agreement regarding the inhibition of corruption practices by the organizational culture of their organization, the capacity of civil society actors to participate in the decision-making process of the organization's policies, if their organization is held accountable for achieving results, the perception of society regarding the performance of the organization, whether their organization coordinates with different government levels, and if society respects unelected government authorities.

As shown in Table 16, the majority (44%) of the respondents agree that the organizational culture of their agency is a relevant factor in inhibiting corruption practices within their organization; 34% of respondents agree with the statement, and 10% strongly agree. However, a significant number of respondents also disagree with the statement (23%), or do not agree or disagree (23%).

TABLE 16

Perception of Organizational Culture and Corruption

(On %)

Degree of agreement	The organizational culture of my agency hinders corruption practices
I strongly disagree	7
I disagree	23
I do not agree or disagree	23
I agree	34
I strongly agree	10
I do not know / I refuse to answer	4
Total	100

Elaborated by the authors.

Regarding civil society participation in decision-making processes, 32% of respondents agree that civil society in this sphere can engage in deciding on the policies of their governmental organizations. However, as shown in Table 17, a significant portion also stated that they disagree (28%) with the statement, or do not agree or disagree (20%).

TABLE 17

Perception of Civil Society Participation in the Decision-Making Process

(On %)

Degree of agreement	Civil society organizations can participate in the decision-making process of the policies of my agency
I strongly disagree	9
I disagree	28
I do not agree or disagree	20
I agree	32
I strongly agree	4
I do not know / I refuse to answer	6
Total	100

Elaborated by the authors.

Most respondents have stated that they agree that their organizations are held accountable for achieving results; 55% of the respondents agree with the statement, and 21% strongly agree. Only 9% disagree and 3% strongly disagree (Table 18).

TABLE 18

Perception about the Expectation to Obtain Results

(On %)

Degree of agreement	My organization is demanded to get results
I strongly disagree	3
I disagree	9
I do not agree or disagree	11
I agree	55
I strongly disagree	21
I do not know / I refuse to answer	2
Total	100

Elaborated by the authors.

Regarding the evaluation of the organization's performance by society, the majority of the answers focus on the categories of "I disagree" (22%), "I do not agree or disagree" (23%) and "I agree" (33%).

TABLE 19

Perception about the Assessment of the Organization's Performance by Society

(On %)

Degree of agreement	My organization has a demand for getting results
I strongly disagree	7
I disagree	22
I do not agree or disagree	23
I agree	33
I strongly agree	11
I do not know / I refuse to answer	4
Total	100

Elaborated by the authors.

Similarly, in relation to the availability of coordination mechanisms between different government levels, responses are concentrated in the I disagree (18%), disagree (21%) and I agree (34%) categories.

TABLE 20

Perceptions about the Availability of Coordination Mechanisms Between Levels of Government

(On %)

Degree of agreement	The management of policies in my work unit's scope includes coordination between different government levels
I strongly disagree	7
I disagree	18
I do not agree or disagree	21
I agree	34
I strongly agree	7
I do not know / I refuse to answer	13
Total	100

Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages.

The respondents' perception of society's respect for unelected government authorities is also split between the categories of "I disagree" (21%), "I do not agree or disagree" (28%) and "I agree" (34%).

TABLE 21

Perception of the Respect Society has for Unelected Authorities

(On %)

Degree of agreement	The company respects the governmental organizations
I strongly disagree	7
I disagree	21
I do not agree or disagree	28
I agree	34
I strongly agree	4
I do not know / I refuse to answer	7
Total	100

Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages.

5.4 Performance

Regarding performance, the survey poses five questions. The survey asks whether the respondents' organizations achieved more or less when compared to five years ago. When the responses of the "More effective" (40%) and "Much more effective" (13%) categories

are added, 53% of the respondents evaluated that their performance improved in recent years (Table 22 and Chart 13).

TABLE 22

Perception of the Agency's Performance Compared to Five Years Ago

(On %)


Degree of agreement	%
It got much worse	7
Less effective	16
The same	14
More effective	40
Much more effective	13
I do not know / I refuse to answer	10
Total	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 13

Perception of Agency's Performance Compared to Five Years Ago

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

We also investigated the respondents' perception about their organizations' performance regarding the achievement of results, available resources, required skills and levels of innovation (Table 23 and Chart 14). Regarding the achievement of the expected results, 44% agree or strongly agree that the policies produced by their organizations have

achieved the expected results. However, 55% stated that they disagree or strongly disagree that the resources available were sufficient to fulfill the functions of the organization. Regarding skills, 45% answered that they agree or strongly agree that the skills of the members of the organization were adequate to achieve organizational goals. Finally, 40% of respondents stated that they disagree or strongly disagree that their organizations are creative and innovative.

TABLE 23

Perception of the Agency's Performance in terms of Results, Resources, Skills, and Innovation

(On %)


Degree of agreement	The policies produced by the organization have reached the expected results	The resources available were sufficient to fulfill the functions of the organization to which I belong	The skills required of the members of the organization I belong to were adequate to reach their goals	My organization is creative and innovative
I strongly disagree	4	13	6	13
I disagree	24	42	26	27
I do not agree or disagree	23	15	21	24
I agree	38	21	40	28
I strongly agree	6	4	5	7
I do not know / I refuse to answer	5	4	3	2
Total	100	100	100	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 14

Perception of the Agency's Performance in terms of Results, Resources, Skills, and Innovation

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

2. Values less than 3% were hidden on the chart for better visualization.

5.5 Professional and sociodemographic profile

The survey questions related to sociodemographic and professional characteristics include questions about gender, race, year of birth, level of schooling, length of service in the public sector, relationship with the public administration, career, agency, association with a federal unit (UF), positionality in a politically appointed position, type of organization (entities owned by the government or governmental entities), and affiliation to a political party. Regarding gender, 64% of the respondents reported being male and 36% reported being female (Table 24 and Chart 15).

TABLE 24

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants by Gender

	Frequency	(%)
Female	1,157	36
Male	2,069	64
Total	3,226	100


Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages.

CHART 15

Proportion of Civil Servants by Gender

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages.

Regarding ethnicity, the majority (62%) of respondents identified themselves as White, while 29% of the respondents identified themselves as Mulatto; 5%, as Black 1% as Asian, and 1% as Indigenous (Table 25 and Chart 16).

TABLE 25

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants by Ethnicity


	Frequency	(%)
Yellow (Asian)	43	1
White	1,994	62
Indigenous	17	1
Mulatto	937	29
Black	130	5
I do not know /I refuse to answer	105	3
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 16

Proportion of Civil Servants by Ethnicity

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

2. Values less than 3% were hidden on the chart for better visualization.

As for schooling, the data points to a high level of education for civil servants, as 59% of the respondents carried out a specialization (33%), masters (18%) or doctorate (8%). Another 31% completed university and 9% only have a high school degree (table 26 and chart 17).

TABLE 26

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants by Educational Level


	Frequency	(%)
High school	264	9
University graduate	978	31
Specialization	1,156	33
Master	556	18
Doctorate	262	8
I do not know / I refuse to answer	10	0
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 17

Proportion of Civil Servants by Educational Level

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

2. Values less than 3% were hidden on the chart for better visualization.

Table 27 and Chart 18 show that most respondents have more than 25 years of public service experience (26%), followed by respondents who have worked for between 11 and 15 years (23%). The lowest percentage is respondents who have between 21 and 25 years of experience in public administration (5%).

TABLE 27

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants by the Length of Service


	Frequency	(%)
Between 1-5 years	592	17
Between 6-10 years	626	20
Between 11-15 years	757	23
Between 16-20 years	276	8
Between 21-25 years	192	5
Over 25 years	769	26
I do not know / I refuse to answer	14	0
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 18

Proportion of Civil Servants by Service Time

(On %)



Elaboração dos autores.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

2. Values less than 3% were hidden on the chart for better visualization.

Table 28 and Chart 19 show that the majority (72%) of the respondents have a civil servant employment relationship with the public administration. 14% of the respondents stated that they had a *vínculo celetista* (CLT-Consolidation of labor laws); 6% have no employment relationship; 6% have other employment relationships, and 2% did not know or did not want to respond.

TABLE 28

Quantity and Proportion of Civil Servants by the Employment Relationship with the Public Administration


	Frequency	(%)
Others	174	6
Civil servant (Statutory)	2,304	72
No employment relationship	228	6
Civil service (CLT-Consolidation of labor laws)	453	14
I do not know / I refuse to answer	67	2
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 19

The Proportion of Civil Servants by the Employment Relationship with the Public Administration

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

As for the career of the respondents in the public administration, the majority of respondents (61%) are in top-level careers. Only 33% are in mid-level careers, and 1% are in the basic level career (Table 29 and Chart 20).

TABLE 29

Number and percentage of civil servants by career

	Frequency	(%)
Basic level careers	34	1
Mid-level career	956	33
Top-level career	2,036	61
No employment relationship	151	4
I do not know / I refuse to answer	49	1
Total	3,226	100


Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages. * Commission office position only

CHART 20

Proportion of civil servants by career

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

Table 30 shows the distribution of respondents by ministries. It is worth noting that there is a concentration in the Ministries of Health (17%); Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications (12%); Justice and Public Security (11%); and Mines and Energy (11%).

TABLE 30

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants per Ministry

Agency	Frequency	(%)
Attorney General's Office	93	2.88
Brazilian Space Agency	8	0.25
National Petroleum Agency - ANP	102	3.16
National Waterway Transportation Agency-ANTAQ	38	1.18
National Authority for Terrestrial Transport-ANTT	159	4.93
National Water Agency-ANA	57	1.77
National Agency for Civil Aviation-ANAC	152	4.71
National Electrical Energy Agency-ANEEL	48	1.49
National Agency of Supplemental Health - ANS	124	3.84
National Telecommunications Agency-ANATEL	178	5.52
National Health Surveillance Agency -ANVISA	193	5.98
Olympic Public Authority	11	0.34
Advanced Electronic Technology Center	24	0.74
Securities Commission - CVM	13	0.4
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission -CNEN	16	0.5
Brazilian Urban Train Company	35	1.08
Mineral Resources Development Company-CDRM	27	0.84
Development Company of the São Francisco Valley-CODEVASF	38	1.18
National Supply Company-CONAB	39	1.21
Administrative Council of Economic Defense - CADE	10	0.31
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development-CNPq	9	0.28
Public Defender of the Union	14	0.43
Brazilian Federal Police	68	2.11
National Agency of Mining and Mineral Resources	16	0.5
National Department of Transport	38	1.18
Federal Highway Patrol	70	2.17
National Department of Works to Combat Drought -DNOCS	4	0.12
Brazilian Agricultural Research Agency-EMBRAPA	72	2.23
Energy Research Company-EPE	2	0.06
Brazilian Company of Logistics and Financial	14	0.43
Porto Alegre Urban Train Company	9	0.28
Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel -CAPES	13	0.4
Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics-IBGE	211	6.54
Jorge Duprat Figueiredo Occupational Safety and Health Foundation	10	0.31
Foundation Alexandre de Gusmão	2	0.06
National School of Public Administration-ENAP	5	0.15
National Health Foundation-FUNASA	36	1.12
National Indian Foundation-FUNAI	42	1.3
Foundation Osório	1	0.03
Foundation Oswaldo Cruz	71	2.2
National Education Development Fund-FNDE	14	0.43
Nuclear Industries of Brazil	23	0.71
Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources-IBAMA	17	0.53

National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality-Inmetro	13	0.4
National Institute for Educational Research and Study-INEP	7	0.22
Brazilian Tourism Institute -Embratur	4	0.12
Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation-ICMBio	30	0.93
Rio de Janeiro Botanic Garden Research Institute	4	0.12
Institute for Applied Economic Research-IPEA	9	0.28
Brazilian Institute of Industrial Property-INP	17	0.53
National Institute of Industrial Property-INPI	47	1.46
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply	81	2.51
Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communication	45	1.39
Ministry of Defense	27	0.84
Ministry of Education	20	0.62
Ministry of the Economy	107	3.32
Ministry of National Integration	8	0.25
Ministry of Justice	26	0.81
Ministry of Health	264	8.18
Ministry of Transparency, Supervision and Control	17	0.53
Ministry for Cities	4	0.12
Ministry of External Relations	28	0.87
Ministry of Mines and Energy	8	0.25
Ministry of Social Development	22	0.68
Ministry of Sports	5	0.15
Ministry for the Environment	6	0.19
Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management-MPOG	69	2.14
Ministry of Labor and Employment	46	1.43
Ministry of Tourism	2	0.06
Ministry of Transport	24	0.74
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade	10	0.31
Nuclebrás -Heavy Equipment Company	18	0.56
Presidency	62	1.92
Federal Data Processing Service -SERPRO	25	0.77
Central-West Development Superintendence	2	0.06
National Superintendency of Complementary Pensions	8	0.25
Superintendence of Private Insurance-SUSEP	12	0.37
Superintendency of Development in Amazonia - SUDAM	5	0.15
Northeast Development Authority-SUDENE	4	0.12
Superintendence of the Manaus Free Zone	1	0.03
VALEC Engineering, Constructions and Railways Company	12	0.37
Vice-presidency of the Republic	1	0.03
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

Table 31 and Chart 21 show that the majority of the respondents (60%) work outside of the Federal District (DF) and 38% work in the Federal District.

TABLE 31

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants per State


	Frequency	(%)
Federal District	1,252	38
Other states	1,943	60
I do not know / I refuse to answer	31	2
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 21

Proportion of Civil Servants per State

(On%)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

The data presented in Table 32 and Chart 22 indicate that the majority of respondents work in an independent agency or public foundation (37%), followed by regulatory agencies (33%) and governmental entities (30%).

TABLE 32

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants by Type of Administration

	Frequency	(%)
Don't know / Refuse to answer	107	4%
Public company	432	14%
Autarchy / Public Foundation	777	24%
Direct Administration	942	29%
Regulatory agency	968	29%
Total	3,226	100


Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages.

CHART 22

Proportion of Civil Servants by Type of Administration

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

2. Values less than 3% were hidden on the chart for better visualization.

Regarding politically appointed positions, 58% of the respondents do not hold a politically appointed position and 42% hold a position of this nature (Table 33 and Chart 23).

TABLE 33

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants per Politically Appointed Position


	Frequency	(%)
Have a politically appointed position	1,433	42
Do not have	1,793	58
Total	3,226	100

Elaborated by the authors.

CHART 23

Proportion of Civil Servants per Politically Appointed Position

(On %)



■ Have a Politically Appointed Position ■ Do not have a Politically Appointed Position

Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

Table 34 and Chart 24 show that the majority of respondents (94%) are not affiliated with a political party.

TABLE 34

Quantity and Percentage of Civil Servants by Party Affiliation

	Frequency	(%)
I do not know/I refuse to answer	3,036	94
Affiliated	154	5
Not Affiliated	36	0
Total	3,226	100


Elaborated by the authors.

Note: Values of approximate percentages.

CHART 24

Proportion of Civil Servants by Party Affiliation

(On %)



Elaborated by the authors.

Note: 1. Values of the approximate percentages.

2. Values less than 3% were hidden on the chart for better visualization.

6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This research report sought to describe the general results of the questionnaire applied to civil servants of the Brazilian public administration between May and July 2018, encompassing career bureaucrats and commissioners of the Federal Executive Branch. The purpose of the research is to advance the understanding of what factors are necessary for governments to achieve their organizational goals and policy proposals - what literature has called state capacity. As noted throughout this report, a variety of theoretical perspectives on state capacity guided us in the creation of the questions of the survey. This plurality will help us to trace the impact of distinct theories on state capacity, allowing for comparisons and overlaps of component dimensions of the concept, and, in future research, to develop new empirical theorizing on the concept.

In this context, the results from the *survey* contribute to the continuing debate on state capacity in Brazil, as well as in comparative studies with other countries. Although this report is not intended to deepen applied theoretical analyses - which will be done in the next products of this project - some interesting results deserve to be highlighted.

Meritocracy is highly valued by civil servants interviewed and has been triggered as a relevant criterion for appointments to politically appointed positions. However, there are obstacles to meritocracy being fully implemented, as many (36% of the respondents) are concerned that their organizations cannot recruit the civil servants with the right skills. Also, it has been found that promotions are not always based on merit.

The data also indicates that the respondents have a positive perception of the autonomy of influencing the internal dynamics of work and influencing the decision-making process. The responses point to a pattern of strong isolation from public administration bodies, especially with the National Congress, Judiciary branches and international organizations. Resources represent a major constraint on state capacities, especially budgetary resources. In relation to the external environment, there is a perception among respondents that their agencies are expected to deliver results.

When responses are compared from the different dimensions of state capabilities, some inconsistencies arise. For example, in the question block on meritocracy, a significant portion (36%) of the respondents revealed that their organization could not recruit the civil servants with the right skills. However, in the block on individual skills, respondents assessed that civil servants in their organizations possess the skills needed, especially related to the knowledge and analysis of public policies in the sector of activity. In the external environment block, 32% agree that civil society organizations are capable of acting in the decision-making process of their organizations. However, in the relationship block, the majority of respondents (56%) said they had not interacted with civil society institutions in the past year. These inconsistencies should be explored in the next stages of the research when the answers are disaggregated by the public policy sector, as well as different organizational structures of the Brazilian public administration.

Although the results point to several obstacles to state capacity, - such as the availability of resources and the isolation of the organizations - a positive perception among the respondents of the organization's performance prevails. Thus, the next stages of the research can, with a more profound dialogue with theory, explore which factors positively impacted the good performance of the agencies, draw comparative analyses between public policy sectors and distinct profiles of bureaucrats, as well as advance in the knowledge about the relationships between the dimensions contemplated by the survey.

It is important to note that the dimensions of meritocracy and autonomy appear correlated in the literature on state capacity (Fukuyama, 2013). These measures are drawn

from minimalist concepts of state capacity, with fewer attributes to be measured. This allows greater applicability of the concept to different cases, offering comparisons between different countries, regimes and economic-political formations.⁷ In contrast, our questionnaire allows entries in different theories about state capacity, bringing dimensions of resources, skills, external environment to the public administration, and their various relationships. This deepening of different dimensions of the concept can provide complementary ways to understand the Brazilian State and, thus, extend our ability to measurement of state capacity and related concepts.

⁷ The CDDRL researchers will compare Brazil with a series of studies on state capacity in different countries.

REFERENCES

ABERS, R. N. Ativismo na burocracia? O médio escalão do Programa Bolsa Verde. In: CAVALCANTE, P.; LOTTA, G. *Burocracia de médio escalão: perfil, trajetória e atuação*. Brasília: Enap, 2015. p. 143-176.

ABERS, R. N.; OLIVEIRA, M. S.; PEREIRA, A. K. Inclusive development and the asymmetric state: big projects and local communities in the Brazilian Amazon. *The Journal of Development Studies*, v. 53, n. 6, p. 857-872, 2017.

ABERS, R. N.; SANTIAGO, A. O. A autonomia do burocrata técnico: o caso do licenciamento ambiental do Ibama. In: PAULA, J. M. P. *et al.* (Orgs.). *Burocracia federal de infraestrutura econômica: reflexões sobre capacidades estatais*. Brasília: Enap; Ipea, 2017.

BERSCH, K.; PRAÇA, S.; TAYLOR, M. M. State capacity, bureaucratic politicization, and corruption in the Brazilian state. *Governance*, v. 30, n. 1, p. 105-124, 2017.

BOITTIN, M.; DISTELHORST, G.; FUKUYAMA, F. “Reassessing the quality of government in China”. Toronto: Osgoode, 2016. (Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series, n. 197).

CAVALCANTE, P.; LOTTA, G. *Burocracia de médio escalão: perfil, trajetória e atuação*. Brasília: Enap, 2015.

CHRISTENSEN, R. K.; GAZLEY, B. Capacity for public administration: Analysis of meaning and measurement. *Public Administration and Development: the International Journal of Management Research and Practice*, v. 28, n. 4, p. 265-279, 2008.

CINGOLANI, L. “The state of state capacity: a review of concepts, evidence and measures”. Maastricht: Maastricht University, 2013. (Working paper).

CINGOLANI, L.; THOMSSON, K.; CROMBRUGGHE, D. Minding Weber more than ever? The impacts of state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy on development goals. *World Development*, v. 72, p. 191-207, 2015.

COCHRAN, W. G. *Sampling Techniques*. New York: Wiley, 1977.

DE PAULA, J. M. P. *et al.* *Burocracia federal de infraestrutura econômica: reflexões sobre capacidades estatais*. Brasília: Enap; Ipea, 2017.

EVANS, P. B. *O Estado como problema e solução*. Nova Lua: São Paulo, n. 28-29, p. 1-29, abr. 1993.

_____. *Embedded Autonomy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

_____. Constructing the 21st Century Developmental State: Potentialities and Pitfalls. In: EDIGHEJI, O. E. (Ed.). *Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: potentials and challenges*. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 2010.

_____. "The Capability Enhancing Developmental State: Concepts and National Trajectories". Center for Studies on Inequality and Development, mar. 2011. Available on: <www.proac.uff.br/cede>. (Discussion Paper, n. 63).

EVANS, P. B.; RUESCHEMEYER, D.; SKOCPOL, T. (Eds.). *Bringing the state back in*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

EVANS, P.; RAUCH, J. E. Bureaucracy, and growth: a cross-national analysis of the effects of "Weberian" state structures on economic growth. *American Sociological Review*, v. 64, n. 5, p. 748-765, 1999.

FEVS – FEDERAL EMPLOYEE VIEWPOINT SURVEY. *Governmentwide Management Report*. Washington: OPM, 2016. Available in: <<https://goo.gl/atsVJt>>.

FUKUYAMA, F. What is governance? *Governance*, v. 26, n. 3, p. 347-368, 2013.

GOMIDE, Alexandre de Ávila; PEREIRA, Ana Karine; MACHADO, Raphael. Apresentação-O conceito de capacidade estatal e a pesquisa científica. *Sociedade e Cultura*, v. 20, n. 1, 2017.

GRISA, C. *et al.* Capacidades estatais para o desenvolvimento rural no Brasil: análise das políticas públicas para a agricultura familiar. *Sociedade e Cultura*, v. 20, 2017.

HOWLETT, Michael; RAMESH, M. Achilles' heels of governance: Critical capacity deficits and their role in governance failures. *Regulation & Governance*, v. 10, n. 4, p. 301-313, 2016.

HUERTA, A. R. Una ruta metodológica para evaluar la capacidad institucional. *Política y Cultura*, n. 30, 119-134, 2008.

Lipsky, Michael. *Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980.

LOTTA, G. S.; FAVARETO, A. Desafios da integração nos novos arranjos institucionais de políticas públicas no Brasil. *Rev. Sociologia Política*, Curitiba, v. 24, n. 57, mar. 2016.

LOTTA, G. S.; SANTIAGO, A. Autonomia e discricionariedade: matizando conceitos-chave para o estado de burocracia. *Revista Brasileira de Informação Bibliográfica em Ciências Sociais – BIB*, v. 83, p. 21-41, 2017.

MANN, M. Infrastructural Power Revisited. *Studies in Comparative International Development – SCID*, v. 43, n. 3, p. 355-365, 2008.

NISTOTSKAYA, Marina; CINGOLANI, Luciana. Bureaucratic structure, regulatory quality, and entrepreneurship in a comparative perspective: Cross-sectional and panel data evidence. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, v. 26, n. 3, p. 519-534, 2015.

PIRES, Roberto Rocha Coelho; GOMIDE, Alexandre de Ávila. Governança e capacidades estatais: uma análise comparativa de programas federais. *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, v. 24, n. 58, p. 121-143, 2016.

- PIRES, Roberto Rocha Coelho. Implementando Desigualdades? Introdução a uma agenda de pesquisa sobre agentes estatais, representações sociais e (re)produção de desigualdades. *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional - IPEA*, v. 13, p. 7-14, 2017.
- ROTHSTEIN, B. *The quality of government: Corruption, social trust, and inequality in international perspective*. Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- SÁTYRO, NGD; CUNHA, ESM; CAMPOS, J. Spatial analysis of social assistance bureaucracy in Brazilian municipalities: notes for a reflection on the capacity to implement this policy. *Opinião Pública*, v. 22, n. 2, p. 286-317, 2016.
- SKOCPOL, T. Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. In: EVANS, P.; RUESCHEMEYER, D.; SKOCPOL, T. *Bringing the State back in*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. p. 3-43.
- SKOCPOL, T.; FINEGOLD, K. State capacity and economic intervention in the early New Deal. *Political Science Quarterly*, v. 97, n. 2, p. 255-278, 1982.
- SOIFER, Hillel; VOM HAU, Matthias. Unpacking the strength of the state: The utility of state infrastructural power. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, v. 43, n. 3-4, p. 219, 2008.
- SOUZA, C. Modernization of the State and construction of bureaucratic capacity for the implementation of federalized policies. *Revista de Administração Pública – RAP*, v. 51, n. 1, 2017.
- TILLY, C. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. 711 p.
- VILAÇA, L. De práticas a capacidades: a atuação de procuradores do Ministério Público Federal no caso de Belo Monte. *Sociedade e Cultura*, v. 20, n. 1, p. 61-82, jan./jun. 2017.
- WU, X.; RAMESH, M.; HOWLETT, M. Policy capacity: A conceptual framework for understanding policy competences and capabilities. *Policy and Society*, v. 34, n. 3-4, p. 165-171, 2015.

APPENDIX A

BOOK OF CODES**Governance and state capabilities - BRICS**

This questionnaire integrates research conducted through a partnership between Ipea and Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. The objective is to understand the motivations of federal civil servants, their work practices, and aspects related to their routines in their organizations. Participation in the research is voluntary and anonymous.

Similar questionnaires are being applied in the BRICS countries. The answers and their analysis will be used for academic purposes and the improvement of the public service, resulting in publications and comparisons between countries.

Any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us in the search *email*: pesquisagovernanca@ipea.gov.br. Or through the coordinators.

Katherine Bersch

Pedro Cavalcante

Raphael Machado

CHART A.1
Questions and questionnaire codes

Block	Introduction	Question	Answer
Sociodemographic I		QA1 - <i>Qual é o seu gênero?</i> What is your gender?	1 Female 2 Male 999 No Answer
		QA2 – <i>Qual é sua raça?</i> What is your ethnicity?	1 Yellow (Asian) 2 White 3 Indigenous people 4 Mulatto 5 Black 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer
		QA3 – <i>Ano de nascimento?</i> Year of birth?	1993 to 2001
		QA4 – <i>Qual é o seu mais alto nível de escolaridade?</i> What is your highest level of education?	1 High school 2 Graduation 3 Specialization 4 Masters 5 Doctorate degree 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer
Meritocracy	QB0A – <i>Em relação a sua organização, avalie o seu grau de concordância com as seguintes afirmações:</i> In relation to your organization, assess your degree of agreement with the following statements:	QB1 – <i>Meu órgão de trabalho é capaz de recrutar pessoas com as habilidades corretas.</i> My work unit is capable of recruiting people with the right skills.	5 I strongly agree 4 I agree 3 I do not agree or disagree 2 I disagree 1 I strongly disagree 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer
		QB2 – <i>Promoções em meu órgão de trabalho são baseadas no mérito.</i> Promotions for political appointees in my work unit are based on merit.	
		QB3 – <i>Indicações para cargos comissionados deveriam ser baseadas no mérito.</i> Nominations for politically appointed	

		positions ⁸ should be based on merit.	
		<p>QB4 – <i>Qual o seu nível de satisfação com o reconhecimento que você recebe por fazer um bom trabalho?</i></p> <p>How satisfied are you with the recognition you receive for doing a good job?</p>	<p>5 Very satisfied 4 Satisfied 3 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 2 Dissatisfied 1 Very dissatisfied 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
	<p>QB0B – <i>Avalie o grau de importância dos itens a seguir para nomeação a cargos comissionados:</i></p> <p>Evaluate the importance of the following items for the nomination to politically appointed positions:⁹</p>	<p>QB5 – <i>Competência técnica.</i></p> <p>Technical competence.</p>	<p>4 Very important 3 Important 2 Unimportant 1 Not important 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>QB6 – <i>Afiliação a partidos políticos.</i></p> <p>Affiliation to political parties.</p>	
		<p>QB7 – <i>Especialização na carreira.</i></p> <p>Career expertise.</p>	
		<p>QB8 – <i>Rede de relacionamento pessoal.</i></p> <p>Network of personal relationships.</p>	
Autonomy	<p>QC0A – <i>Avalie o seu grau de concordância com os itens a seguir:</i></p> <p>Evaluate your degree of agreement with the following items:</p>	<p>QC1 – <i>Minha percepção é que o governo utiliza ao máximo minhas habilidades.</i></p> <p>I feel like the government takes maximum advantage of my talents.</p>	<p>5 I strongly agree 4 I agree 3 I do not agree or disagree 2 I disagree 1 I strongly disagree 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>QC2 – <i>Em meu atual cargo sinto-me encorajado a trazer novos e melhores modos de trabalho.</i></p>	

⁸ Alternative translation: “Nominations for commissioned office positions”.

⁹ Alternative translation: “Evaluate the importance of the following items for the appointment of commission office positions”.

		<p>In my current position, I feel encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing things.</p>	
		<p>QC3 – <i>Tenho condições para tomar decisões próprias na realização do meu trabalho.</i></p> <p>I can make my own decisions when doing my job.</p>	
		<p>QC4 – <i>A aprovação de um projeto depende das minhas considerações técnicas.</i></p> <p>Approval of a project depends on my technical considerations.</p>	
		<p>QC5 – <i>Qual o nível de satisfação com o seu envolvimento nas decisões que afetam seu trabalho?</i></p> <p>How satisfied are you with your involvement in decisions that affect your job?</p>	<p>5 Very satisfied 4 Satisfied 3 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 2 Unsatisfied 1 Very dissatisfied 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>QC6 – <i>Com que frequência regras e regulamentos formais impedem que você execute seu trabalho?</i></p> <p>How often do rules and formal regulations impede your ability to do your job?</p>	<p>5 Always 4 Often 3 Sometimes 2 Rarely 1 Never 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>QC7 – <i>Uma carreira de alto nível no setor público é desejada entre os graduados das melhores universidades do país.</i></p> <p>Graduates from the country's best universities desire a</p>	<p>5 I strongly agree 4 I agree 3 I do not agree or disagree 2 I disagree 1 I strongly disagree 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>

		<p>top-level career in the public sector.</p>	
		<p>QC8 – <i>Servidores nunca se beneficiam de seus cargos, exceto pelo seu salário.</i></p> <p>Civil servants never benefit from their jobs, except for their salary.</p>	
		<p>QC9 – <i>Servidores são politicamente neutros no desempenho de suas funções.</i></p> <p>Civil servants are politically neutral in performing their jobs.</p>	
		<p>QC10 – <i>Servidores devem obedecer estritamente aos seus superiores.</i></p> <p>Civil servants should strictly obey their superiors.</p>	
		<p>QC11 – <i>Servidores possuem liberdade para substituir regras formais em favor de seu próprio julgamento.</i></p> <p>Civil servants are free to replace formal rules in favor of their judgment.</p>	
	<p>QC0B – <i>Ter conexões políticas pode ser importante no setor público em algumas ocasiões. Avalie o grau de importância dos itens a seguir:</i></p> <p>Having political connections can be important in</p>	<p>QC12 – Obter um aumento salarial.</p> <p>Obtaining a salary increase.</p>	<p>4 Very important 3 Important 2 Unimportant 1 Not important 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>QC13 – <i>Alcançar o objetivo da política pública.</i></p> <p>Reaching the public policy's goal.</p>	

	the public sector on some occasions. Evaluate the degree of importance of political connections to the following items: ¹⁰		
External environment	<p>QD0 – <i>Avalie o seu grau de concordância com os itens a seguir:</i></p> <p>How much do you agree with the following statements:</p>	<p>QD1 – <i>A cultura organizacional de meu órgão dificulta práticas de corrupção.</i></p> <p>The organizational culture of my agency makes it difficult for corruption practices to take place.</p> <p>QD2 – <i>Organizações da sociedade civil são capazes de participar do processo de tomada de decisão das políticas do meu órgão.</i></p> <p>Civil society organizations are able to participate in the policy decision-making processes of the agency where I work.</p> <p>QD3 – <i>Minha organização é cobrada em relação à obtenção de resultados.</i></p> <p>My organization is held accountable for achieving results.</p> <p>QD4 – <i>O desempenho da minha organização é bem avaliado pela sociedade.</i></p> <p>My organization's performance is well-evaluated by society.</p>	<p>5 I strongly agree 4 I agree 3 I do not agree or disagree 2 Disagree 1 I strongly disagree 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>

¹⁰ Direct translation from Portuguese: “Evaluate the degree of importance of the following items”.

		<p>QD5 – <i>A gestão das políticas de competência do meu órgão conta com instrumentos de coordenação entre diferentes níveis de governo.</i></p> <p>The management of policies in my work unit includes coordination between different government levels.</p>	
		<p>QD6 – <i>A sociedade respeita as autoridades governamentais não eleitas.</i></p> <p>Society respects unelected government authorities.</p>	
Resources	<p>QE0 – <i>Os itens a seguir são obstáculos ao bom desempenho do seu órgão:</i></p> <p>Are the following items obstacles to your work unit's performance:</p>	<p>QE1 – <i>Recursos humanos.</i></p> <p>Human Resources.</p> <p>QE2 – <i>Orçamento.</i></p> <p>Budget.</p> <p>QE3 – <i>Recursos tecnológicos.</i></p> <p>Technological resources.</p> <p>QE4 – <i>Estabilidade do quadro dirigente.</i></p> <p>Turnover of senior management.</p> <p>QE5 – <i>Processos de planeamento, monitoramento e avaliação.</i></p> <p>Planning, monitoring and evaluation processes.</p> <p>QE6 – <i>Legislação.</i></p> <p>Legislation.</p>	<p>5 I strongly agree 4 I agree 3 I do not agree or disagree 2 I disagree 1 I strongly disagree 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>

		<p>QE7 – <i>Instrumentos de relacionamento com o Poder Judiciário e o Ministério Público.</i></p> <p>Coordination¹¹ with the Judiciary Branch and the Federal Prosecution Service.</p>
		<p>QE8 – <i>Instrumentos de coordenação com o Poder Legislativo.</i></p> <p>Coordination¹² with the Legislative Branch.</p>
		<p>QE9 – <i>Coordenação interfederativa com estados e municípios.</i></p> <p>Interfederal coordination with states and municipalities.</p>
		<p>QE10 – <i>Auditorias e processos de controle.</i></p> <p>Audits and control processes.</p>
		<p>QE11 – <i>Instrumentos de participação social.</i></p> <p>Social participation.¹³</p>
		<p>QE12 – <i>Acesso aos principais decisores políticos.</i></p> <p>Access to key political decision makers.</p>
		<p>QE13 – <i>Interferência político-partidária.</i></p> <p>Political party interference.</p>

¹¹ Direct translation from Portuguese: “Instruments of relationship”.

¹² Direct translation from Portuguese: “Instruments of coordination”.

¹³ Direct translation from Portuguese: “Social participation instruments”.

Relationships	<p>QF0 – <i>Nos últimos 12 meses, com que frequência você interagiu com:</i></p> <p>In the last 12 months, how often did you interact with:</p>	<p>QF1 – <i>Outras organizações ou agências ligadas ao órgão que você trabalha atualmente.</i></p> <p>Other organizations or agencies linked to the agency you currently work for.</p>	<p>5 Weekly 4 Monthly 3 Quarterly 2 Semester 1 None in the last year 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>QF2 – <i>Órgãos de outros ministérios.</i></p> <p>Other ministries or agencies.</p>	
		<p>QF3 – <i>Congresso/ Parlamentares.</i></p> <p>Congress / Congressional Representatives.</p>	
		<p>QF4 – <i>Judiciário/ Membros do judiciário.</i></p> <p>Judiciary/ Judiciary members.</p>	
		<p>QF5 – <i>Órgãos de controle (TCU, CGU, Ministérios Público).</i></p> <p>Institutions of accountability¹⁴ (Federal Court of Accounts, Office of the Comptroller General - CGU, Federal Prosecution Service).</p>	
		<p>QF6 – <i>Prefeituras.</i></p> <p>Local Government.¹⁵</p>	
		<p>QF7 – <i>Governos estaduais.</i></p> <p>State Government.</p>	
		<p>QF8 – <i>Empresas privadas.</i></p>	

¹⁴ Direct translation from Portuguese: “Control bodies”.

¹⁵ City/Town Hall

		<p>Private companies.</p> <p>QF9 – <i>Organizações internacionais.</i></p> <p>International Organizations.</p> <p>QF10 – <i>Organizações da sociedade civil.</i></p> <p>Civil society organizations.</p> <p>QF11 – <i>Universidades e institutos de pesquisa.</i></p> <p>Universities and research institutes.</p>	
Skills	<p>QG0 – <i>Os servidores de sua organização possuem as habilidades descritas abaixo? Avalie o seu grau de concordância com os itens a seguir:</i></p> <p>Do your organization's civil servants have the skills described below? Please rate your level of agreement with the following:</p>	<p>QG1 – <i>Conhecimentos das políticas públicas do setor de atuação.</i></p> <p>Knowledge of public policies in their policy field.</p> <p>QG2 – <i>Habilidades de pesquisa.</i></p> <p>Research skills.</p> <p>QG3 – <i>Habilidades para analisar políticas públicas.</i></p> <p>Policy analysis skills.</p> <p>QG4 – <i>Liderança.</i></p> <p>Leadership.</p> <p>QG5 – <i>Habilidades para gerenciamento de conflitos.</i></p> <p>Conflict management skills.</p> <p>QG6 – <i>Habilidades de construção de relações interpessoais.</i></p> <p>Interpersonal relationship building skills.</p>	<p>5 I strongly agree 4 I agree 3 I do not agree or disagree 2 Disagree 1 I strongly disagree 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>

		<p>QG7 – <i>Habilidade de comunicação.</i></p> <p>Communication skills.</p>	
		<p>QH1 – Atualmente, sua organização alcançou mais ou menos resultados comparados a cinco anos atrás?</p> <p>Has your organization become more or less effective over the past five years?</p>	<p>5 Much more effective 4 More effective 3 Same 2 Less effective 1 Worsened a lot</p> <p>999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>QH2 – <i>As políticas produzidas pela organização a qual pertença atingiram os resultados esperados.</i></p> <p>The policies produced by my organization achieve the expected results.¹⁶</p>	
		<p>QH3 – <i>Os recursos disponíveis foram suficientes para o cumprimento das funções da organização à qual pertença.</i></p> <p>The resources available were sufficient to fulfill the tasks in my organization.</p>	
		<p>QH4 – <i>As habilidades requeridas dos integrantes da organização a que pertença estiveram adequadas para o alcance de seus objetivos.</i></p> <p>My work unit is able to recruit people with the right skills.¹⁷</p>	
		<p>QH5 – <i>Minha organização é criativa e inovadora.</i></p>	

¹⁶ Alternative translation: “My agency is successful at accomplishing its mission”.

¹⁷ Alternative translation: “The skills required of members in my organization were adequate to reach the organization’s goals”.

		My organization is creative and innovative.	
Sociodemographic II		<p>Q11 – <i>Há quantos anos você atua no serviço público?</i></p> <p>How many years have you been in the public service?</p>	<p>1 Between 1-5 years</p> <p>2 Between 6-10 years</p> <p>3 Between 11-15 years</p> <p>4 Between 16-20 years</p> <p>5 Between 21-25 years</p> <p>6 More than 25 years</p> <p>999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>Q12 – <i>Qual é o seu vínculo com a administração pública?</i></p> <p>What is your relationship with the public administration?</p>	<p>1 Civil servant (Statutory)</p> <p>2 No employment relationship</p> <p>3 Civil service (CLT-Consolidation of labor laws)</p> <p>999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>Q13 – <i>Qual é a sua carreira?</i></p> <p>What is your job type (career)?</p>	<p>1 Basic Level Career</p> <p>2 Mid-level Career</p> <p>3 Superior Level Career</p> <p>4 No employment relationship with the public administration</p> <p>999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>Q14 – <i>Sua organização pertence a qual ministério?</i></p> <p>Which ministry does your organization belong to?</p>	<p>A1 Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply</p> <p>A2 Cities</p> <p>A3 Science, Technology, Innovations and Communications</p> <p>A4 Culture</p> <p>A5 Defense</p> <p>A6 Social development</p> <p>A7 Human rights</p> <p>A8 Education</p> <p>A9 Sports</p> <p>A10 Finance</p> <p>A11 Industry, foreign trade, and services</p> <p>A12 National Integration</p> <p>A13 Justice and Public Security</p> <p>A14 Environment</p> <p>A15 Mines and energy</p> <p>A16 Planning, development, and management</p> <p>A17 External relations</p> <p>A18 Health</p> <p>A19 Work</p>

		<p>A20 Transparency, Supervision, and CGU</p> <p>A21 Transport, ports, and civil aviation</p> <p>A22 Tourism</p> <p>A23 Secretary of Government / PR</p> <p>A24 General Secretariat / PR</p> <p>A25 Federal Attorney General</p> <p>A26 Central Bank of Brazil</p> <p>A27 Civil House</p> <p>A28 Institutional Security Office</p> <p>999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
	<p>Q15 – <i>Você trabalha no Distrito Federal ou em outra unidade da Federação?</i></p> <p>Do you work in the Federal District or another Federal Unit (UF)?</p>	<p>1 Federal District</p> <p>2 Other UF</p> <p>999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
	<p>Q16 – <i>Em que tipo de organização você trabalha atualmente?</i></p> <p>In what type of organization do you currently work?</p>	<p>1 Governmental Entities (ministry/agency)</p> <p>2 Regulatory Agency</p> <p>3 Entities owned by the government / public foundation</p> <p>4 Public Company</p> <p>999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
	<p>Q17 – <i>Em qual órgão você trabalha atualmente?</i></p> <p>In which ministry/agency do you currently work?</p>	<p>Write the name of the agency in full, without accent, cedilla, or abbreviations.</p>
	<p>Q18 – <i>Você possui cargo comissionado?</i></p> <p>Do you have a politically appointed position?¹⁸</p>	<p>1 Yes</p> <p>2 No</p>
<p><i>Se sim na resposta anterior:</i></p> <p>If yes in the previous answer:</p>	<p>Q19 – <i>Qual é o seu cargo comissionado?</i></p>	<p>1 Function / gratification</p> <p>2 DAS or equivalent (free appointment/discharge)</p> <p>3 Other</p> <p>999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>

¹⁸ Alternative translation: “Do you have a commissioned position”.

		What is your politically appointed position? ¹⁹	
		<p>QI10 – <i>Você é filiado a algum partido político?</i></p> <p>Are you affiliated with any political party?</p>	<p>1 Yes 2 No</p>
Vignettes		<p>QJ1 - I) <i>Dois servidores pertencem a mesma carreira, porém um está a mais tempo no cargo que o outro. O servidor com menos tempo apresenta maiores habilidades técnicas e obtém nomeação a cargo comissionado antes do servidor mais antigo na carreira.</i></p> <p>Two civil servants perform the same job, but one has been on the job for longer. The civil servant with less career time has better technical skills and is nominated to a commissioned job before the civil servant who has been working for longer.</p>	<p>4 Completely meritocratic 3 Partially meritocratic 2 Little meritocratic 1 Nothing meritocratic 999 I do not know / I refuse to answer</p>
		<p>QJ2 - II) <i>Um servidor público proveniente de uma família influente trabalha em um órgão que deseja estabelecer parcerias com o empresariado local. Este servidor é promovido, nomeado para um cargo de confiança, em detrimento de outros servidores com as mesmas competências técnicas e tempo de serviço.</i></p> <p>A civil servant from an influential family works in an agency that wishes to establish</p>	

¹⁹ Alternative translation: “What is your commissioned position”.

		<p>partnerships with local businesspeople. This civil servant gets a promotion, appointed to a position of trust, to the detriment of other civil servants with the same technical skills and time of service.</p>	
		<p>QJ3 - III) <i>O governo adota um sistema de promoção nas carreiras com base em pontuação e com o objetivo de promover a diversidade concede pontos extras para minorias étnico-raciais.</i></p> <p>The government adopts a career-based promotion system based on scoring and, to promote diversity, grants extra points for ethnic-racial minorities.</p>	
		<p>QJ4 - IV) <i>O governo adota um sistema de promoção nas carreiras com base em pontuação e com o objetivo de promover a diversidade concede pontos extras para mulheres.</i></p> <p>The government adopts a career promotion system based on scoring and, to promote diversity, it grants extra points for women.</p>	

Elaborated by the authors.

Note: There are 32 questions in this quiz.